-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-26:76.ocs_fc Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: Multiple vulnerabilities in the ocs_fc(4) driver Category: core Module: ocs_fc Announced: 2026-11-17 Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD. Corrected: 2026-11-03 08:56:14 UTC (stable/15, 15.1-STABLE) 2026-11-17 17:08:06 UTC (releng/15.1, 15.1-RELEASE-p7) 2026-11-03 09:00:17 UTC (stable/14, 14.5-STABLE) 2026-11-17 17:05:06 UTC (releng/14.5, 14.5-RELEASE-p4) 2026-11-17 17:04:08 UTC (releng/14.4, 14.4-RELEASE-p13) CVE Name: CVE-2026-127752, CVE-2026-127753, CVE-2026-127754 For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the following sections, please visit . I. Background The ocs_fc(4) driver supports Emulex Fibre Channel host bus adapters in both initiator and target modes. It provides a management interface to userspace through /dev/ocsN device nodes. II. Problem Description Several vulnerabilities were found in the ocs_fc(4) driver. The driver's ioctl(2) interface, which members of the operator group can access, did not require superuser privileges and did not adequately validate requests. Among other problems, it failed to bound user-supplied buffer sizes and PCI configuration space offsets, and could issue adapter commands referencing freed memory. (CVE-2026-127752) The driver did not adequately validate the length of FCP command frames received from initiators, and did not range check exchange identifiers reported by the adapter, potentially leading to out-of-bounds memory accesses. (CVE-2026-127753) When rejecting a Process Login (PRLI) request with an unsupported FC-4 type, the driver sent a second response for the same exchange, resulting in a use-after-free. Any port which had completed a Port Login (PLOGI) could trigger this with a single PRLI. Additionally, formatting the adapter's active profile ID could overflow a stack buffer. (CVE-2026-127754) III. Impact A local user in the operator group can use the ioctl(2) interface to corrupt kernel memory or reprogram the adapter, potentially gaining full control of the system. A remote port on the same Fibre Channel fabric can trigger a use-after-free or out-of-bounds memory access in the kernel, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) or potentially arbitrary code execution in the kernel. IV. Workaround No workaround is available, but systems without adapters supported by ocs_fc(4) are not affected. V. Solution Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date, and reboot the system. Perform one of the following: 1) To update your vulnerable system installed from base system packages: Systems running a 15.0-RELEASE or later version of FreeBSD on the amd64 or arm64 platforms, which were installed using base system packages, can be updated via the pkg(8) utility: # pkg upgrade -r FreeBSD-base # shutdown -r +10min "Rebooting for a security update" 2) To update your vulnerable system installed from binary distribution sets: Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the amd64 or arm64 platforms which were not installed using base system packages can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility: # freebsd-update fetch # freebsd-update install # shutdown -r +10min "Rebooting for a security update" 3) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable FreeBSD release branches. a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-26:76/ocs_fc.patch # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-26:76/ocs_fc.patch.asc # gpg --verify ocs_fc.patch.asc b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root: # cd /usr/src # patch -E -p0 < /path/to/patch c) Recompile your kernel as described in and reboot the system. VI. Correction details This issue is corrected as of the corresponding Git commit hash in the following stable and release branches: Branch/path Hash Revision - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- stable/15/ fab3594e208f stable/15-n286564 releng/15.1/ 0e43807b1535 releng/15.1-n283664 stable/14/ 5f5d5abc37d0 stable/14-n275444 releng/14.5/ 10783f288172 releng/14.5-n274908 releng/14.4/ c37ff9b36ee9 releng/14.4-n273809 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Run the following command to see which files were modified by a particular commit: # git show --stat Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the hash: To determine the commit count in a working tree (for comparison against nNNNNNN in the table above), run: # git rev-list --count --first-parent HEAD VII. References The latest revision of this advisory is available at -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJPBAEBCgA5FiEEthUnfoEIffdcgYM7bljekB8AGu8FAmr82jEbFIAAAAAABAAO bWFudTIsMi41KzEuMTIsMCwzAAoJEG5Y3pAfABrv0kEP/0/DIzIimbKQnFERyJCu p5gCldd+IzoHkMybQOp/os9LHxrhTY8WjWDOu5LcjNtbdam4k8MJ4XjufD/zlEz/ jpw5os8nLfYycVsBEkfOfT2obdcFPwiYvfVecqTiPhaXYfN0aK9uD5coQm3H1qjD dcTHXy28auYA6HZgYmfYdRFDq5cO4k/S69XUNLm/ByiCF4NRYdtScBfCeqwQRbZs OWNdw7nmDIknFOZdItw5wyM0IesU9xlMdDwCU4wlgZ+F+Tx7/DpBJu6rdGpOpYKu P3KA+US6QShM1G051xJaLqVE6k1WP5DQE2qluNW3MSGzmVeLDW87HkLB/v0dZtXy 9iOF9Pv5rQxF/hMVmwP8j3/e/3nZ77lqRCOVgrlsIZI/hYEblgeJmKfnluHgG2yE nqEZ+N7qBG0DGqO+/kyqU5mmYLzK5PR8Tbyw81fumdfRga9FKSE9AA+v3OT0x+yt dFGgc+KWDYGOFjUPsllgHO+8WEuvfrRmLC5QzTvKnaYz22lCiC0BaSXJjlXL+IAC AiYKW4Gl2V4AU38cgWpbboNak4zRQg+/mN8uRB2PUqLFx9mN+Wdhg5M7Hc8kq7L/ 6JDtA72LKDjqWFcoR5+EaHedS+qmGzG07NWTAkePIcKNR4QaPfR6vXZ/cmi1M59p 2RHxcpOpBd18bwWRv11jnogS =EmiJ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----