-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-26:73.caroot Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: TLS certificate store update due to eMudhra compromise Category: core Module: caroot Announced: 2026-10-21 Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD. Corrected: 2026-10-21 04:42:19 UTC (stable/15, 15.1-STABLE) 2026-10-21 04:44:35 UTC (releng/15.1, 15.1-RELEASE-p6) 2026-10-21 04:42:07 UTC (stable/14, 14.5-STABLE) 2026-10-21 04:44:07 UTC (releng/14.5, 14.5-RELEASE-p3) 2026-10-21 04:43:22 UTC (releng/14.4, 14.4-RELEASE-p12) For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the following sections, please visit . I. Background The root certificate bundle is the trust store that is used by OpenSSL programs and libraries to aid in determining whether it should trust a given TLS certificate. It is generated from the root certificate list maintained by Mozilla's Network Security Services (NSS) project. II. Problem Description eMudhra generated several of its TLS intermediate CA certificates using a flawed procedure that used trivially small private keys. The keys have been recovered by several parties and publicly disclosed. The intermediates are signed by the "emSign ECC Root CA - G3" root certificate, which was included in the trusted certificate bundle. The intermediates have been revoked, but OpenSSL does not check certificate revocation by default. The corrected bundle marks "emSign ECC Root CA - G3" as untrusted. It also incorporates the other root certificate additions and removals in NSS 3.131.1. III. Impact An attacker able to intercept network traffic can use the compromised keys to issue a certificate that impersonates any TLS server, allowing the traffic to be read or modified without detection. IV. Workaround The certctl(8) utility manages the trust store. The affected root certificate can be marked untrusted manually: # cp /etc/ssl/certs/14bc7599.0 /usr/share/certs/untrusted/14bc7599.pem # certctl rehash The file 14bc7599.0 corresponds to "emSign ECC Root CA - G3" as listed by `certctl list`. Software that uses its own trust store is not affected. V. Solution Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date, and restart all daemons that use OpenSSL, or reboot the system. Perform one of the following: 1) To update your vulnerable system installed from base system packages: Systems running a 15.0-RELEASE or later version of FreeBSD on the amd64 or arm64 platforms, which were installed using base system packages, can be updated via the pkg(8) utility: # pkg upgrade -r FreeBSD-base 2) To update your vulnerable system installed from binary distribution sets: Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the amd64 or arm64 platforms which were not installed using base system packages can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility: # freebsd-update fetch # freebsd-update install Users of FreeBSD Update should ensure that freebsd-update(8) is allowed to create and delete files. This is allowed by default. 3) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable FreeBSD release branches. a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. [FreeBSD 15.1] # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-26:73/caroot-15.patch # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-26:73/caroot-15.patch.asc # gpg --verify caroot-15.patch.asc [FreeBSD 14.5] # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-26:73/caroot-14.5.patch # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-26:73/caroot-14.5.patch.asc # gpg --verify caroot-14.5.patch.asc [FreeBSD 14.4] # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-26:73/caroot-14.4.patch # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-26:73/caroot-14.4.patch.asc # gpg --verify caroot-14.4.patch.asc b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root: # cd /usr/src # patch -E -p0 < /path/to/patch c) Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as described in . Restart all daemons that use OpenSSL, or reboot the system. VI. Correction details This issue is corrected as of the corresponding Git commit hash in the following stable and release branches: Branch/path Hash Revision - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- stable/15/ adab1d807360 stable/15-n286061 releng/15.1/ 10201c02ac78 releng/15.1-n283642 stable/14/ 6853bad2e25a stable/14-n275372 releng/14.5/ 923a96f4d870 releng/14.5-n274897 releng/14.4/ 091c8ad19f88 releng/14.4-n273796 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Run the following command to see which files were modified by a particular commit: # git show --stat Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the hash: To determine the commit count in a working tree (for comparison against nNNNNNN in the table above), run: # git rev-list --count --first-parent HEAD VII. References The latest revision of this advisory is available at -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJPBAEBCgA5FiEEthUnfoEIffdcgYM7bljekB8AGu8FAmrYXJUbFIAAAAAABAAO bWFudTIsMi41KzEuMTIsMCwzAAoJEG5Y3pAfABrvhbgQAJIRSTS1G6neqLDAN4jK lJuAYCueN6zk1+K1Ve4pkhHRrwBDKybO7UnFywT+tYlGqB4NhtHj+/0ACwPgKOz3 vPCj9qdR0IbgwORKfwVtDMhCrcp4PFc7lPk4p8rUx28mO0B6KoQuS2DWuTWKLoH0 pSiOZJy6rWlXoWsRfSzyHc/YaABzvcPUiu+P5wdXobutNDH+z6eB1Ix5cSL+Ran7 xeDVxMNMr6UiaqrVBhn9U6mtgWSWtrnVsGIz9RoHkNAPQ90UU6lY70foCsLbt6up Uv+oMncTiXCGIJx54eN8BmuSewgoopfIMgUk7k4PHVZqTJZymSEKlbv5yyKGIGl4 sAe/FIknJlm86K53bPaqLpi0EhxRpkPwSiOGhrU2tfoFNK9bi+XgmSjVKVLmxo+b dv3i2pqJBjgcivVsf9ByMjTPyKM8GAmaDc5WN12OAhufqld641aAEbNCQcwKWk9R ZQVhDyffGKvCvTQQVWS7sb8poBkCptvcK2JLig0D2adKfNYfhJ8gwWqjH1gJJ3zr jfaOZ0NcLVYalnYgUqvU4Z15AwKpZPYwFUSXPdI9CGK1SLP/yirmG+IyBvqV6tKa cbKFlHkLaMDsZDOgzJaIyU/1+hwHn9NiqUmtg81MKiNkJ6V3af8iBitTai54nKTl PUDc2S0W6JALSLf8nORNNHbs =jwIl -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----