-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-20:30.ftpd Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: ftpd privilege escalation via ftpchroot feature Category: core Module: ftpd Announced: 2020-09-15 Credits: Anonymous working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative Affects: All supported versions of FreeBSD. Corrected: 2020-09-15 20:55:13 UTC (stable/12, 12.2-STABLE) 2020-09-15 21:47:44 UTC (releng/12.2, 12.2-BETA1-p1) 2020-09-15 21:47:44 UTC (releng/12.1, 12.1-RELEASE-p10) 2020-09-15 20:56:14 UTC (stable/11, 11.4-STABLE) 2020-09-15 21:47:44 UTC (releng/11.4, 11.4-RELEASE-p4) 2020-09-15 21:47:44 UTC (releng/11.3, 11.3-RELEASE-p14) CVE Name: CVE-2020-7468 For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories, including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the following sections, please visit . I. Background ftpd(8) is a daemon that implements an FTP server. To restrict filesystem access of authenticated clients, ftpd(8) supports the ftpchroot(5) feature, which allows the system administrator to designate a root directory for each FTP user. This is implemented using the chroot(2) system call. II. Problem Description A ftpd(8) bug in the implementation of the file system sandbox, combined with capabilities available to an authenticated FTP user, can be used to escape the file system restriction configured in ftpchroot(5). Moreover, the bug allows a malicious client to gain root privileges. III. Impact A malicious FTP user can gain privileged access to an affected system. IV. Workaround No workaround is available. Systems not running ftpd(8) or not making use of ftpchroot(5) are not affected. Exploitation of the bug requires that a malicious FTP client have login access to the server. Anonymous access is not sufficient. V. Solution Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date. Perform one of the following: 1) To update your vulnerable system via a binary patch: Systems running a RELEASE version of FreeBSD on the i386 or amd64 platforms can be updated via the freebsd-update(8) utility: # freebsd-update fetch # freebsd-update install Restart the applicable daemons, or reboot the system. 2) To update your vulnerable system via a source code patch: The following patches have been verified to apply to the applicable FreeBSD release branches. a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility. # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:30/ftpd.patch # fetch https://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-20:30/ftpd.patch.asc # gpg --verify ftpd.patch.asc b) Apply the patch. Execute the following commands as root: # cd /usr/src # patch < /path/to/patch c) Recompile the operating system using buildworld and installworld as described in . Restart the applicable daemons, or reboot the system. VI. Correction details The following list contains the correction revision numbers for each affected branch. Branch/path Revision - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- stable/12/ r365772 releng/12.2/ r365781 releng/12.1/ r365781 stable/11/ r365773 releng/11.4/ r365781 releng/11.3/ r365781 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To see which files were modified by a particular revision, run the following command, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number, on a machine with Subversion installed: # svn diff -cNNNNNN --summarize svn://svn.freebsd.org/base Or visit the following URL, replacing NNNNNN with the revision number: VII. References The latest revision of this advisory is available at -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQKTBAEBCgB9FiEE/A6HiuWv54gCjWNV05eS9J6n5cIFAl9hOJhfFIAAAAAALgAo aXNzdWVyLWZwckBub3RhdGlvbnMub3BlbnBncC5maWZ0aGhvcnNlbWFuLm5ldEZD MEU4NzhBRTVBRkU3ODgwMjhENjM1NUQzOTc5MkY0OUVBN0U1QzIACgkQ05eS9J6n 5cJCRA//Zuuqyaim3BnR0Qs9mSI3fm37AQN9NyV0GzaP6ayAeCu7xuyzMzFD58jU SZAkrH16buh34dfelwofPSO8ZIAHZ0X6PpVWHwrTkrT8ADHCuJwEe0imG5MDDJn4 mMJSA9OVyQXgHXApnOhJ4hHMUfGF0QJvsOvPQ4f8J3J9K9pTa78HgekaNWkgpTzo eAGV+lug/UwsK//FrcyYaifZF1xl0ZKSAl6RVFVaqxxVXZGZ2txlew4I03NEfqjJ PAmviQ1p0BO5tMqVSG+/VkuYFJNyUGvuSrvUeIoQnoWljvKx5VnAq5KVCD6La1nn o5JzNEvlqzOC1ClribxALyv/VJHJt6PDBF4S26ATwIdr8TCzSpe2Byjj9KN/qC94 JuT6hScERpT4ARIsJiDIDe0+9zBeglJuS/3sJozI+ani+VL/7uBL6MB50twgioFG 4+5MNgc4VYgX35U0z+fStncZAScByXWdxaMDYx9brfZeaeEhiZA6wXYCf8kpaW94 zDOvBCH+GR1O2nALdlMVFrThQdTkq1AtMQ58Uuaxpu1LBGrMVfz/VCDEurWog+U1 7uxRwx9o6lJvno3oPQTfHkcuHZosOE0KdfdJ1Tcmj1pVZVjeaxu7HEW2H73YRhBN Fc4XIxaO7URyYwtzxzH9yU18wKCp+g/mm5apgbbcz1kBS+fR3Go= =zvW4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----