-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-01:65 Security Advisory FreeBSD, Inc. Topic: Buffer overflow in libgtop_server Category: ports Module: libgtop Announced: 2001-12-11 Credits: Flavio Veloso Affects: Ports collection prior to the correction date Corrected: 2001-11-29 15:06:19 UTC FreeBSD only: NO I. Background libgtop is a library for gtop, the GNOME version of the top command. The top command is a tool to display and update information about the top cpu processes. II. Problem Description The libgtop port versions prior to libgtop-1.0.12_1 contain a stack buffer overflow in libgtop_server, allowing an arbitrary amount of data from the client application (assumed to be gtop) to be read into a fixed-sized buffer. A local attacker can exploit this bug to cause libgtop_server to execute arbitrary code. libgtop_server runs with increased privileges as a member of group kmem, which allows it to read kernel memory (but not write it). A process with the ability to read from kernel memory can monitor privileged data such as network traffic, disk buffers and terminal activity, and may be able to leverage this to obtain further privileges on the local system or on other systems, including root privileges. The libgtop port is not installed by default, nor is it "part of FreeBSD" as such: it is part of the FreeBSD ports collection, which contains over 6000 third-party applications in a ready-to-install format. The ports collection shipped with FreeBSD 4.4 contains this problem since it was discovered after the release. FreeBSD makes no claim about the security of these third-party applications, although an effort is underway to provide a security audit of the most security-critical ports. III. Impact A successful exploit of this stack buffer overflow would allow an attacker arbitrary access to kernel memory, possibly acquiring information allowing further increases in privileges. No exploit is known to exist at this time, and it is not known whether this buffer overflow is exploitable even in theory. In any case, local access to the machine on which libgtop_server is running is required to attempt an attack. IV. Workaround 1) Deinstall the libgtop port/package if you have it installed. OR 2) Remove the setgid bit from the libgtop_server executable by executing the following command as root: # chmod g-s `which libgtop_server` V. Solution 1) Upgrade your entire ports collection and rebuild the port. 2) Deinstall the old package and install a new package dated after the correction date, obtained from the following directories: [i386] ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/i386/packages-4-stable/devel/libgtop-1.0.12_1.tar.gz ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/i386/packages-5-current/devel/libgtop-1.0.12_1.tar.gz [alpha] Packages are not automatically generated for the alpha architecture at this time due to lack of build resources. NOTE: It may be several days before updated packages are available. Be sure to check the file creation date on the package, because the version number of the software has not changed. 3) Download a new port skeleton for the libgtop port from: http://www.freebsd.org/ports/ and use it to rebuild the port. 4) Use the portcheckout utility to automate option (3) above. The portcheckout port is available in /usr/ports/devel/portcheckout or the package can be obtained from: ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/i386/packages-4-stable/devel/portcheckout-2.0.tgz ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/ports/i386/packages-5-current/devel/portcheckout-2.0.tgz VI. Correction details The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was corrected in the FreeBSD ports collection. Path Revision - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- ports/devel/libgtop/Makefile 1.45 ports/devel/libgtop/files/patch-src::daemon::gnuserv.c 1.1 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- VII. References -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Comment: http://www.nectar.cc/pgp iQCVAwUBPBY6xlUuHi5z0oilAQHwmQQAh3KtiIcKjmw5e9B2ABmdRYlwWFVEgN9F QlUj8NqiDUaekQoLb5p923Y8VC0/9e/alRrnvd4kcmVmU8PUpXNaMp4cHz1mHnLQ 7w4QQ+qzmEOGJFOiUjE21FY8gPR3HH2rKiIOJyeHezRkUqhWMqlERJ08hnmtqjib 2TukQesxbzw= =gyPX -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----