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MAC_MLS(4)	       FreeBSD Kernel Interfaces Manual		    MAC_MLS(4)

     mac_mls --	Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy

     To	compile	MLS into your kernel, place the	following lines	in your	kernel
     configuration file:

	   options MAC
	   options MAC_MLS

     Alternately, to load the MLS module at boot time, place the following
     line in your kernel configuration file:

	   options MAC

     and in loader.conf(5):


     The mac_mls policy	module implements the Multi-Level Security, or MLS
     model, which controls access between subjects and objects based on	their
     confidentiality by	means of a strict information flow policy.  Each sub-
     ject and object in	the system has an MLS label associated with it;	each
     subject's MLS label contains information on its clearance level, and each
     object's MLS label	contains information on	its classification.

     In	MLS, all system	subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
     labels, made up of	a sensitivity level and	zero or	more compartments.
     Together, these label elements permit all labels to be placed in a	par-
     tial order, with confidentiality protections based	on a dominance opera-
     tor describing the	order.	The sensitivity	level is expressed as a	value
     between 0 and 65535, with higher values reflecting	higher sensitivity
     levels.  The compartment field is expressed as a set of up	to 256 compo-
     nents, numbered from 1 to 256.  A complete	label consists of both sensi-
     tivity and	compartment elements.

     With normal labels, dominance is defined as a label having	a higher or
     equal active sensitivity level, and having	at least all of	the same com-
     partments as the label to which it	is being compared.  With respect to
     label comparisons,	``lower'' is defined as	being dominated	by the label
     to	which it is being compared, and	``higher'' is defined as dominating
     the label to which	it is being compared, and ``equal'' is defined as both
     labels being able to satisfy the dominance	requirements over one another.

     Three special label values	exist:

	   Label	Comparison
	   mls/low	dominated by all other labels
	   mls/equal	equal to all other labels
	   mls/high	dominates all other labels

     The ``mls/equal'' label may be applied to subjects	and objects for	which
     no	enforcement of the MLS security	policy is desired.

     The MLS model enforces the	following basic	restrictions:

     +o	 Subjects may not observe the processes	of another subject if its
	 clearance level is lower than the clearance level of the object it is
	 attempting to observe.

     +o	 Subjects may not read,	write, or otherwise observe objects without
	 proper	clearance (e.g.	subjects may not observe objects whose classi-
	 fication label	dominates its own clearance label)

     +o	 Subjects may not write	to objects with	a lower	classification level
	 than its own clearance	level.

     +o	 A subject may read and	write to an object if its clearance level is
	 equal to the object's classification level as though MLS protections
	 were not in place.

     These rules prevent subjects of lower clearance from gaining access
     information classified beyond its clearance level in order	to protect the
     confidentiality of	classified information,	subjects of higher clearance
     from writing to objects of	lower classification in	order to prevent the
     accidental	or malicious leaking of	information, and subjects of lower
     clearance from observing subjects of higher clearance altogether.	In
     traditional trusted operating systems, the	MLS confidentiality model is
     used in concert with the Biba integrity model (mac_biba(4)) in order to
     protect the Trusted Code Base (TCB).

   Label Format
     Almost all	system objects are tagged with an effective, active label ele-
     ment, reflecting the classification of the	object,	or classification of
     the data contained	in the object.	In general, object labels are repre-
     sented in the following form:


     For example:


     Subject labels consist of three label elements: an	effective (active)
     label, as well as a range of available labels.  This range	is represented
     using two ordered MLS label elements, and when set	on a process, permits
     the process to change its active label to any label of greater or equal
     integrity to the low end of the range, and	lesser or equal	integrity to
     the high end of the range.	 In general, subject labels are	represented in
     the following form:


     For example:


     Valid ranged labels must meet the following requirement regarding their

	   rangehigh >=	effective >= rangelow

     One class of objects with ranges currently	exists,	the network interface.
     In	the case of the	network	interface, the effective label element refer-
     ences the default label for packets received over the interface, and the
     range represents the range	of acceptable labels of	packets	to be trans-
     mitted over the interface.

   Runtime Configuration
     The following sysctl(8) MIBs are available	for fine-tuning	the enforce-
     ment of this MAC policy.	  Enables the enforcement of the MLS confiden-
				  tiality policy.  (Default: 1).  Label	pty(4)s	as ``mls/equal'' upon cre-
				  ation.  (Default: 0).
				  Revoke access	to objects if the label	is
				  changed to a more sensitive level than the
				  subject.  (Default: 0).

     Currently,	the mac_mls policy relies on superuser status (suser(9)) in
     order to change network interface MLS labels.  This will eventually go
     away, but it is currently a liability and may allow the superuser to
     bypass MLS	protections.

     mac(4), mac_biba(4), mac_bsdextended(4), mac_ifoff(4), mac_lomac(4),
     mac_none(4), mac_partition(4), mac_portacl(4), mac_seeotheruids(4),
     mac_test(4), maclabel(7), mac(9)

     The mac_mls policy	module first appeared in FreeBSD 5.0 and was developed
     by	the TrustedBSD Project.

     This software was contributed to the FreeBSD Project by Network Asso-
     ciates Laboratories, the Security Research	Division of Network Associates
     Inc. under	DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 (``CBOSS''), as part of
     the DARPA CHATS research program.

     While the MAC Framework design is intended	to support the containment of
     the root user, not	all attack channels are	currently protected by entry
     point checks.  As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on,
     in	isolation, to protect against a	malicious privileged user.

FreeBSD	Ports 11.2		 July 25, 2015		    FreeBSD Ports 11.2


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