Skip site navigation (1)Skip section navigation (2)

FreeBSD Man Pages

Man Page or Keyword Search:
Man Architecture
Apropos Keyword Search (all sections) Output format
home | help
MAC_IFOFF(4)	       FreeBSD Kernel Interfaces Manual		  MAC_IFOFF(4)

NAME
     mac_ifoff -- interface silencing policy

SYNOPSIS
     To	compile	the interface silencing	policy into your kernel, place the
     following lines in	your kernel configuration file:

	   options MAC
	   options MAC_IFOFF

     Alternately, to load the interface	silencing policy module	at boot	time,
     place the following line in your kernel configuration file:

	   options MAC

     and in loader.conf(5):

	   mac_ifoff_load="YES"

DESCRIPTION
     The mac_ifoff interface silencing module allows administrators to enable
     and disable incoming and outgoing data flow on system network interfaces
     via the sysctl(8) interface.

     To	disable	network	traffic	over the loopback (lo(4)) interface, set the
     sysctl(8) OID security.mac.ifoff.lo_enabled to 0 (default 1).

     To	enable network traffic over other interfaces, set the sysctl(8)	OID
     security.mac.ifoff.other_enabled to 1 (default 0).

     To	allow BPF traffic to be	received, even while other traffic is dis-
     abled, set	the sysctl(8) OID security.mac.ifoff.bpfrecv_enabled to	1
     (default 0).

   Label Format
     No	labels are defined.

SEE ALSO
     mac(4), mac_bsdextended(4), mac_lomac(4), mac_mls(4), mac_none(4),
     mac_partition(4), mac_portacl(4), mac_seeotheruids(4), mac_test(4),
     mac(9)

HISTORY
     The mac_ifoff policy module first appeared	in FreeBSD 5.0 and was devel-
     oped by the TrustedBSD Project.

AUTHORS
     This software was contributed to the FreeBSD Project by Network Asso-
     ciates Labs, the Security Research	Division of Network Associates Inc.
     under DARPA/SPAWAR	contract N66001-01-C-8035 (``CBOSS''), as part of the
     DARPA CHATS research program.

BUGS
     See mac(9)	concerning appropriateness for production use.	The TrustedBSD
     MAC Framework is considered experimental in FreeBSD.

     While the MAC Framework design is intended	to support the containment of
     the root user, not	all attack channels are	currently protected by entry
     point checks.  As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on,
     in	isolation, to protect against a	malicious privileged user.

FreeBSD	10.1		       December	10, 2002		  FreeBSD 10.1

NAME | SYNOPSIS | DESCRIPTION | SEE ALSO | HISTORY | AUTHORS | BUGS

Want to link to this manual page? Use this URL:
<https://www.freebsd.org/cgi/man.cgi?query=mac_ifoff&sektion=4&manpath=FreeBSD+10.0-RELEASE>

home | help