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GELI(8) 		FreeBSD System Manager's Manual 	       GELI(8)

NAME
     geli -- control utility for cryptographic GEOM class

SYNOPSIS
     To compile GEOM_ELI into your kernel, place the following lines in your
     kernel configuration file:

	   device crypto
	   options GEOM_ELI

     Alternately, to load the GEOM_ELI module at boot time, place the follow-
     ing line in your loader.conf(5):

	   geom_eli_load="YES"

     Usage of the geli(8) utility:

     geli init [-bPv] [-a aalgo] [-B backupfile] [-e ealgo] [-i iterations]
	   [-K newkeyfile] [-l keylen] [-s sectorsize] prov
     geli label - an alias for init
     geli attach [-dprv] [-k keyfile] prov
     geli detach [-fl] prov ...
     geli stop - an alias for detach
     geli onetime [-d] [-a aalgo] [-e ealgo] [-l keylen] [-s sectorsize] prov
     geli configure [-bB] prov ...
     geli setkey [-pPv] [-i iterations] [-k keyfile] [-K newkeyfile]
	   [-n keyno] prov
     geli delkey [-afv] [-n keyno] prov
     geli kill [-av] [prov ...]
     geli backup [-v] prov file
     geli restore [-v] file prov
     geli clear [-v] prov ...
     geli dump [-v] prov ...
     geli list
     geli status
     geli load
     geli unload

DESCRIPTION
     The geli utility is used to configure encryption on GEOM providers.

     The following is a list of the most important features:

	   +o   Utilizes the crypto(9) framework, so when there is crypto hard-
	       ware available, geli will make use of it automatically.
	   +o   Supports many cryptographic algorithms (currently AES,
	       Blowfish, Camellia and 3DES).
	   +o   Can optionally perform data authentication (integrity verifica-
	       tion) utilizing one of the following algorithms: HMAC/MD5,
	       HMAC/SHA1, HMAC/RIPEMD160, HMAC/SHA256, HMAC/SHA384 or
	       HMAC/SHA512.
	   +o   Can create a key from a couple of components (user entered
	       passphrase, random bits from a file, etc.).
	   +o   Allows to encrypt the root partition - the user will be asked
	       for the passphrase before the root file system is mounted.
	   +o   The passphrase of the user is strengthened with: B. Kaliski,
	       PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography Specification, Version
	       2.0., RFC, 2898.
	   +o   Allows to use two independent keys (e.g.  "user key" and
	       "company key").
	   +o   It is fast - geli performs simple sector-to-sector encryption.
	   +o   Allows to backup/restore Master Keys, so when a user has to
	       quickly destroy his keys, it is possible to get the data back
	       by restoring keys from the backup.
	   +o   Providers can be configured to automatically detach on last
	       close (so users do not have to remember to detach providers
	       after unmounting the file systems).
	   +o   Allows to attach a provider with a random, one-time key - use-
	       ful for swap partitions and temporary file systems.
	   +o   Allows to verify data integrity (data authentication).

     The first argument to geli indicates an action to be performed:

     init	Initialize provider which needs to be encrypted.  Here you can
		set up the cryptographic algorithm to use, key length, etc.
		The last provider's sector is used to store metadata.  The
		init subcommand also automatically backups metadata in
		/var/backups/_prov_.eli file.  The metadata can be recovered
		with the restore subcommand described below.

		Additional options include:

		-a aalgo  Enable data integrity verification (authentication)
			  using the given algorithm.  This will reduce size of
			  available storage and also reduce speed.  For exam-
			  ple, when using 4096 bytes sector and HMAC/SHA256
			  algorithm, 89% of the original provider storage will
			  be available for use.  Currently supported algo-
			  rithms are: HMAC/MD5, HMAC/SHA1, HMAC/RIPEMD160,
			  HMAC/SHA256, HMAC/SHA384 and HMAC/SHA512.  If the
			  option is not given, there will be no authentica-
			  tion, only encryption.  The recommended algorithm is
			  HMAC/SHA256.

		-b	  Ask for the passphrase on boot, before the root par-
			  tition is mounted.  This makes it possible to use an
			  encrypted root partition.  One will still need
			  bootable unencrypted storage with a /boot/ direc-
			  tory, which can be a CD-ROM disc or USB pen-drive,
			  that can be removed after boot.

		-B backupfile
			  File name to use for metadata backup instead of the
			  default /var/backups/_prov_.eli.  To inhibit back-
			  ups, you can use none as the backupfile.

		-e ealgo  Encryption algorithm to use.	Currently supported
			  algorithms are: AES, Blowfish, Camellia and 3DES.
			  The default and recommended algorithm is AES.

		-i iterations
			  Number of iterations to use with PKCS#5v2.  If this
			  option is not specified, geli will find the number
			  of iterations which is equal to 2 seconds of crypto
			  work.  If 0 is given, PKCS#5v2 will not be used.

		-K newkeyfile
			  Specifies a file which contains part of the key.  If
			  newkeyfile is given as -, standard input will be
			  used.  Here is how more than one file with a key
			  component can be used:

				# cat key1 key2 key3 | geli init -K - /dev/da0

		-l keylen
			  Key length to use with the given cryptographic algo-
			  rithm.  If not given, the default key length for the
			  given algorithm is used, which is: 128 for AES, 128
			  for Blowfish, 128 for Camellia and 192 for 3DES.

		-P	  Do not use passphrase as the key component.

		-s sectorsize
			  Change decrypted provider's sector size.  Increasing
			  sector size allows to increase performance, because
			  we need to generate an IV and do encrypt/decrypt for
			  every single sector - less number of sectors means
			  less work to do.

     attach	Attach the given provider.  The master key will be decrypted
		using the given passphrase/keyfile and a new GEOM provider
		will be created using the given provider's name with an ".eli"
		suffix.

		Additional options include:

		-d	 If specified, a decrypted provider will be detached
			 automatically on last close.  This can help with
			 short memory - user does not have to remember to
			 detach the provider after unmounting the file system.
			 It only works when the provider was opened for writ-
			 ing, so it will not work if the file system on the
			 provider is mounted read-only.  Probably a better
			 choice is the -l option for the detach subcommand.

		-k keyfile
			 Specifies a file which contains part of the key.  For
			 more information see the description of the -K option
			 for the init subcommand.

		-p	 Do not use passphrase as the key component.

		-r	 Attach read-only provider.  It will not be opened for
			 writing.

     detach	Detach the given providers, which means remove the devfs entry
		and clear the keys from memory.

		Additional options include:

		-f	 Force detach - detach even if the provider is open.

		-l	 Mark provider to detach on last close.  If this
			 option is specified, the provider will not be
			 detached until it is open, but when it will be closed
			 last time, it will be automatically detached (even if
			 it was only opened for reading).

     onetime	Attach the given providers with random, one-time keys.	The
		command can be used to encrypt swap partitions or temporary
		file systems.

		Additional options include:

		-a aalgo  Enable data integrity verification (authentication).
			  For more information, see the description of the
			  init subcommand.

		-e ealgo  Encryption algorithm to use.	For more information,
			  see the description of the init subcommand.

		-d	  Detach on last close.  Note, the option is not
			  usable for temporary file systems as the provider
			  will be detached after creating the file system on
			  it.  It still can (and should be) used for swap par-
			  titions.  For more information, see the description
			  of the attach subcommand.

		-l keylen
			  Key length to use with the given cryptographic algo-
			  rithm.  For more information, see the description of
			  the init subcommand.

		-s sectorsize
			  Change decrypted provider's sector size.  For more
			  information, see the description of the init subcom-
			  mand.

     configure	Change configuration of the given providers.

		Additional options include:

		-b  Set the BOOT flag on the given providers.  For more infor-
		    mation, see the description of the init subcommand.

		-B  Remove the BOOT flag from the given providers.

     setkey	Change or setup (if not yet initialized) selected key.	There
		is one master key, which can be encrypted with two independent
		user keys.  With the init subcommand, only key number 0 is
		initialized.  The key can always be changed: for an attached
		provider, for a detached provider or on the backup file.  When
		a provider is attached, the user does not have to provide an
		old passphrase/keyfile.

		Additional options include:

		-i iterations
			 Number of iterations to use with PKCS#5v2.  If 0 is
			 given, PKCS#5v2 will not be used.  To be able to use
			 this option with setkey subcommand, only one key have
			 to be defined and this key has to be changed.

		-k keyfile
			 Specifies a file which contains part of the old key.

		-K newkeyfile
			 Specifies a file which contains part of the new key.

		-n keyno
			 Specifies the number of the key to change (could be 0
			 or 1).  If the provider is attached and no key number
			 is given, the key used for attaching the provider
			 will be changed.  If the provider is detached (or we
			 are operating on a backup file) and no key number is
			 given, the key decrypted with the passphrase/keyfile
			 will be changed.

		-p	 Do not use passphrase as the old key component.

		-P	 Do not use passphrase as the new key component.

     delkey	Destroy (overwrite with random data) the selected key.	If one
		is destroying keys for an attached provider, the provider will
		not be detached even if all keys will be destroyed.  It can be
		even rescued with the setkey subcommand.

		-a	 Destroy all keys (does not need -f option).

		-f	 Force key destruction.  This option is needed to
			 destroy the last key.

		-n keyno
			 Specifies the key number.  If the provider is
			 attached and no key number is given, the key used for
			 attaching the provider will be destroyed.  If
			 provider is detached (or we are operating on a backup
			 file) the key number has to be given.

     kill	This command should be used in emergency situations.  It will
		destroy all keys on the given provider and will detach it
		forcibly (if it is attached).  This is absolutely a one-way
		command - if you do not have a metadata backup, your data is
		gone for good.	In case the provider was attached with the -r
		flag, the keys will not be destroyed, only the provider will
		be detached.

		-a	 If specified, all currently attached providers will
			 be killed.

     backup	Backup metadata from the given provider to the given file.

     restore	Restore metadata from the given file to the given provider.

     clear	Clear metadata from the given providers.

     dump	Dump metadata stored on the given providers.

     list	See geom(8).

     status	See geom(8).

     load	See geom(8).

     unload	See geom(8).

     Additional options include:

     -v  Be more verbose.

SYSCTL VARIABLES
     The following sysctl(8) variables can be used to control the behavior of
     the ELI GEOM class.  The default value is shown next to each variable.
     All variables can also be set in /boot/loader.conf.

     kern.geom.eli.debug: 0
	     Debug level of the ELI GEOM class.  This can be set to a number
	     between 0 and 3 inclusive.  If set to 0, minimal debug informa-
	     tion is printed.  If set to 3, the maximum amount of debug infor-
	     mation is printed.

     kern.geom.eli.tries: 3
	     Number of times a user is asked for the passphrase.  This is only
	     used for providers which should be attached on boot (before the
	     root file system is mounted).  If set to 0, attaching providers
	     on boot will be disabled.	This variable should be set in
	     /boot/loader.conf.

     kern.geom.eli.overwrites: 5
	     Specifies how many times the Master-Key will be overwritten with
	     random values when it is destroyed.  After this operation it is
	     filled with zeros.

     kern.geom.eli.visible_passphrase: 0
	     If set to 1, the passphrase entered on boot (before the root file
	     system is mounted) will be visible.  This possibility should be
	     used with caution as the entered passphrase can be logged and
	     exposed via dmesg(8).  This variable should be set in
	     /boot/loader.conf.

     kern.geom.eli.threads: 0
	     Specifies how many kernel threads should be used for doing soft-
	     ware cryptography.  Its purpose is to increase performance on SMP
	     systems.  If hardware acceleration is available, only one thread
	     will be started.  If set to 0, CPU-bound thread will be started
	     for every active CPU.

     kern.geom.eli.batch: 0
	     When set to 1, can speed-up crypto operations by using batching.
	     Batching allows to reduce number of interrupts by responding on a
	     group of crypto requests with one interrupt.  The crypto card and
	     the driver has to support this feature.

EXIT STATUS
     Exit status is 0 on success, and 1 if the command fails.

EXAMPLES
     Initialize a provider which is going to be encrypted with a passphrase
     and random data from a file on the user's pen drive.  Use 4kB sector
     size.  Attach the provider, create a file system and mount it.  Do the
     work.  Unmount the provider and detach it:

	   # dd if=/dev/random of=/mnt/pendrive/da2.key bs=64 count=1
	   # geli init -s 4096 -K /mnt/pendrive/da2.key /dev/da2
	   Enter new passphrase:
	   Reenter new passphrase:
	   # geli attach -k /mnt/pendrive/da2.key /dev/da2
	   Enter passphrase:
	   # dd if=/dev/random of=/dev/da2.eli bs=1m
	   # newfs /dev/da2.eli
	   # mount /dev/da2.eli /mnt/secret
	   ...
	   # umount /mnt/secret
	   # geli detach da2.eli

     Create an encrypted provider, but use two keys: one for your girlfriend
     and one for you (so there will be no tragedy if she forgets her
     passphrase):

	   # geli init /dev/da2
	   Enter new passphrase:   (enter your passphrase)
	   Reenter new passphrase:
	   # geli setkey -n 1 /dev/da2
	   Enter passphrase:	   (enter your passphrase)
	   Enter new passphrase:   (let your girlfriend enter her passphrase ...)
	   Reenter new passphrase: (... twice)

     You are the security-person in your company.  Create an encrypted
     provider for use by the user, but remember that users forget their
     passphrases, so back Master Key up with your own random key:

	   # dd if=/dev/random of=/mnt/pendrive/keys/`hostname` bs=64 count=1
	   # geli init -P -K /mnt/pendrive/keys/`hostname` /dev/ad0s1e
	   # geli backup /dev/ad0s1e /mnt/pendrive/backups/`hostname`
	   (use key number 0, so the encrypted Master Key by you will be overwritten)
	   # geli setkey -n 0 -k /mnt/pendrive/keys/`hostname` /dev/ad0s1e
	   (allow the user to enter his passphrase)
	   Enter new passphrase:
	   Reenter new passphrase:

     Encrypted swap partition setup:

	   # dd if=/dev/random of=/dev/ad0s1b bs=1m
	   # geli onetime -d -e 3des ad0s1b
	   # swapon /dev/ad0s1b.eli

     The example below shows how to configure two providers which will be
     attached on boot (before the root file system is mounted).  One of them
     is using passphrase and three keyfiles and the other is using only a key-
     file:

	   # dd if=/dev/random of=/dev/da0 bs=1m
	   # dd if=/dev/random of=/boot/keys/da0.key0 bs=32k count=1
	   # dd if=/dev/random of=/boot/keys/da0.key1 bs=32k count=1
	   # dd if=/dev/random of=/boot/keys/da0.key2 bs=32k count=1
	   # cat /boot/keys/da0.key0 /boot/keys/da0.key1 /boot/keys/da0.key2 | geli init -b -K - da0
	   Enter new passphrase:
	   Reenter new passphrase:
	   # dd if=/dev/random of=/dev/da1s3a bs=1m
	   # dd if=/dev/random of=/boot/keys/da1s3a.key bs=128k count=1
	   # geli init -b -P -K /boot/keys/da1s3a.key da1s3a

     The providers are initialized, now we have to add those lines to
     /boot/loader.conf:

	   geli_da0_keyfile0_load="YES"
	   geli_da0_keyfile0_type="da0:geli_keyfile0"
	   geli_da0_keyfile0_name="/boot/keys/da0.key0"
	   geli_da0_keyfile1_load="YES"
	   geli_da0_keyfile1_type="da0:geli_keyfile1"
	   geli_da0_keyfile1_name="/boot/keys/da0.key1"
	   geli_da0_keyfile2_load="YES"
	   geli_da0_keyfile2_type="da0:geli_keyfile2"
	   geli_da0_keyfile2_name="/boot/keys/da0.key2"

	   geli_da1s3a_keyfile0_load="YES"
	   geli_da1s3a_keyfile0_type="da1s3a:geli_keyfile0"
	   geli_da1s3a_keyfile0_name="/boot/keys/da1s3a.key"

     Not only configure encryption, but also data integrity verification using
     HMAC/SHA256.

	   # geli init -a hmac/sha256 -s 4096 /dev/da0
	   Enter new passphrase:
	   Reenter new passphrase:
	   # geli attach /dev/da0
	   Enter passphrase:
	   # dd if=/dev/random of=/dev/da0.eli bs=1m
	   # newfs /dev/da0.eli
	   # mount /dev/da0.eli /mnt/secret

     geli backups metadata by default to the /var/backups/_prov_.eli file.  If
     metadata is lost in any way (eg. by accidental overwrite), it can be
     restored.	Consider the following situation:

	   # geli init /dev/da0
	   Enter new passphrase:
	   Reenter new passphrase:

	   Metadata backup can be found in /var/backups/da0.eli and
	   can be restored with the following command:

		   # geli restore /var/backups/da0.eli /dev/da0

	   # geli clear /dev/da0
	   # geli attach /dev/da0
	   geli: Cannot read metadata from /dev/da0: Invalid argument.
	   # geli restore /var/backups/da0.eli /dev/da0
	   # geli attach /dev/da0
	   Enter passphrase:

DATA AUTHENTICATION
     geli can verify data integrity when an authentication algorithm is speci-
     fied.  When data corruption/modification is detected, geli will not
     return any data, but instead will return an error (EINVAL).  The offset
     and size of the corrupted data will be printed on the console.  It is
     important to know against which attacks geli provides protection for your
     data.  If data is modified in-place or copied from one place on the disk
     to another even without modification, geli should be able to detect such
     a change.	If an attacker can remember the encrypted data, he can over-
     write any future changes with the data he owns without notice.  In other
     words geli will not protect your data against replay attacks.

SEE ALSO
     crypto(4), gbde(4), geom(4), loader.conf(5), gbde(8), geom(8), crypto(9)

HISTORY
     The geli utility appeared in FreeBSD 6.0.	Support for Camellia block
     cipher is implemented by Yoshisato Yanagisawa in FreeBSD 7.0.

AUTHORS
     Pawel Jakub Dawidek <pjd@FreeBSD.org>

FreeBSD 7.2			August 29, 2008 		   FreeBSD 7.2

NAME | SYNOPSIS | DESCRIPTION | SYSCTL VARIABLES | EXIT STATUS | EXAMPLES | DATA AUTHENTICATION | SEE ALSO | HISTORY | AUTHORS

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